Showing posts with label Strategy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Strategy. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

Thoughts on Warfare

The type of arms (tanks, stealth fighters, aircraft carriers) the US military possesses are too costly for the Third World conflicts we consistently find ourselves fighting, and too vulnerable to modern precision weapons for the type of Great Power battles we prepare for.

Replacing the tanks, jet fighters, and gun-armed warships of the last century are new robot weapons including precision guided bombs, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles.

Expensive platforms like the Abrams Main Battle Tank, F-22 Raptor stealth fighter, and Nimitz class supercarriers are not required to carry the new robot weapons.

The new capital ship at sea is the attack submarine. Of all the legacy warships developed around the turn of the 20th century: aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers, only the new U-boats possess the inherent stealthiness to survive in the cruise missiles age.

With the "one shot, one kill" accuracy of modern missile weapons, has the gun itself become obsolete? Its very purpose was centered on the need to bracket a target with multiple shells to ensure a hit. The microchip has made the need for such wasteful expenditure of ammo unnecessary.

Robot weapons have returned the initiative on land to the foot soldier, taken from him early in the 20th century by mass firepower and the tank. We saw this dawn in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, then vanish deceptively during the 1991 Gulf War, only to reemerge dramatically in the insurgent conflicts at the opening of the 21st Century.

Man portable surface to air missiles (SAMs), and antitank guided missile (ATGM) have leveled the field between industrial age planes and tanks and the infantryman.

The submarine is the only evolutionary warship, currently duplicating the missions of all major surface warships. It's cruise missiles make it an aircraft carrier, its torpedoes a destroyer, while stealthy eavesdropping abilities mimics the traditional role of cruisers from early last century.

Wednesday, May 21, 2008

The Stagnation of Warfare Pt. 3

Hate to say I told you so but...from Strategypage:

The U.S. Secretary of Defense has ordered the service chiefs and
their subordinates to cut back on developing weapons and tactics for the next
war (wherever and whatever it might be), and concentrate on the current ones.
This directive is based on the assumption that the U.S. military can already
defeat any potential foe, and the near future appears to include more irregular
fighters and terrorists, than masses of tanks, modern aircraft and high tech
warships...

The Department of Defense wants the troops to become more
effective at dealing with irregulars and terrorists. The current war is giving
the ground troops invaluable combat experience, making American ground forces
the most capable on the planet. The idea is to capitalize on that, not new,
untried and very expensive technology.

I am convinced that it is not so much our high tech wonder weapons that has given the US its wave of victories in the post-Cold War era, but how it schools its troops in warfare (train as you would fight). Only this can explain our ability to fight 2 simultaneous conflicts since 2001, while keeping watch on China, North Korea, and Iran, despite suffering in the Clinton Era the largest defense cuts since after World War 2.

Therefore, I believe the US can safely endure a "weapons holiday" with a freeze on building Big Ships, while bolstering our littoral fleet to fight pirate insurgents. We could also hold off plans for reequipping the USAF with hi-tech fighters and concentrate on close air support planes, plus late model fighters like the F-16 or Super Hornet to keep numbers up. The Army already seems to be doing everything right. As mentioned in the article they are backing off some on the Future Combat System while beefing up its forces with off-the-shelf equipment like Strykers and armored cars, armor for the troops, and new build helicopters.

Thursday, May 15, 2008

It Takes a War

We applaud the US Army, the sacrifices and tough choices the leadership has made to transform the forces in Iraq into battle winning anti-insurgents. Earlier, under the guidance of then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld the decision was made to cancel the Comanche stealth helicopter and the massive Crusader artillery system, which saved billions that could be funneled into essential utility choppers and wheeled vehicles urgently needed in the warzone. We've little doubt, though, had there not have been an Iraq Insurgency the Army would still be planning to fight the next Desert Storm.

The Navy and Air Force hasn't been so fortunate, if that is the right phrase, to be tested in the same manner. Only such extreme measures as trial-by-combat is valid proof whether our pet theories and chosen weaponry are up to the tasks mapped out in wargames. The lack of a peer enemy in the air or at sea has offered these services little incentive for variation in their equipment purchases or their plans for future warfare. With only previous conflicts as a reference, World War 2 for the Navy and Vietnam for the USAF, their only recourse has been to refight the same battles over and over.

The opening of the War on Terror did offer a golden opportunity for a freeze on Big Ship construction, for the Navy to move aggressively to control the littorals, interdicting the passage of terrorist pirates and illegal weapons in the shallow seas. Instead, 7 years since 9/11 the purchasing of Cold War era ships and planes continues unabated as does the cost of such last century armaments. The service belatedly deployed the first of 3 Riverine Squadrons to the Middle East in 2006, some 3 years into the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. A new littoral combat ship, a concept riddled with numerous faults and excessive cost overruns won't enter full service until almost a decade after the design was finalized, if then.

With the $300 million F-22 Raptor unlikely to be ordered in large numbers, the USAF would have been better served to order new late model F-15s, F-16s, or even brand new F/A-18 Super Hornets to replace thousands of warplanes already aged from 2 decades of service before 2001. Instead, the old warhorses continue to serve in the frontlines to this day. With the further unlikelihood that the Raptor will be used in close air support missions for the land battle in Iraq and Afghanistan, there seems no replacement in sight for the near term for our antiquated airpower.

Regrettably but inevitably it takes a war to shake the hidebound mindset of the admirals and generals. radical thinkers, too often out of favor in peacetime by the military elite, must be welcomed back with open arms if we hope to overcome the desperation tactics of our enemy, the kind we are seeing in Radical Islam. Though we dread the Pearl Harbors at sea or the Blitzkrieg on land, they are too often necessary to awake us from our self-imposed lethargy.